A paper I wrote on Daniel Dennet in summer 2005.
Phil. 331
Final Essay
“Dennett’s View of The Self as an Abstractum”
August 2nd 2005
Jesse Willis
Dennett’s view of the self is paradigmatically different than the traditional Cartesian view of the self. It owes much to Hume’s ‘bundle of perceptions’ but elucidates it and gives some modern experimental data as examples of why we should accept it. I find myself enchanted with his theory and have some refinements that I think can enhance his case for the self being viewed as a narrative center of gravity.
Dennett explains his view of what a self is by a simple analogy. His example is a “center of gravity”. Newtonian physics and our functioning understanding of it both posit that every object that has mass also has a center of gravity. But that this center of gravity is not any particular physical thing within the object. That is to say, it isn’t one particular atom within the mass or a subatomic particle, it has no mass itself, nor a detectable physical characteristics that we normally associate with real things. But we can calculate where it is given an understanding of the mass and distribution of the object itself. As Dennett says; “It has no physical properties at all, except for spatio-temporal location.” As such it is an abstractum, a purely abstract object. Dennett also calls it “a theorist's fiction” and gives us some samples of how a center of gravity works. But first, why do we even concern ourselves with the abstract at all? Because answers to some kinds of questions demand it. Questions of the sort ‘why did object X not tip over’ are often best answered by appeal to X’s center of gravity. Dennett also points out that a center of gravity can disobey the laws of physics, “an abstractum,” he says, “is not bound by all the constraints of physical travel.” The center of gravity on a pitcher can be changed instantaneously, for example, by putting a piece of gum on a pitcher’s handle. Nothing within the atomic or molecular structure of the pitcher has changed, no energies have been added or taken away and yet something has moved as the pitcher’s ‘tipping point’ is now altered. A self, Dennett argues, is very much like a center of gravity an abstract, another “theorist's fiction”. But in this case, the science backing this abstractum isn’t physics; it is human behavior and our way of explaining it. We explain human action by referring to a narrative center of gravity for every human, something we call a self. Dennett doesn’t pretend that the two abstracta are at the same scale of complexity; he realizes that selves are more complicated. But he uses narrative itself, and our relationship to it to further explain his idea.
Dennett explains a fundamental property of fictional objects is indeterminacy using fictional characters as an example. Aristotle, a real human, had many properties that we know of. He was male, was a philosopher and studied with Plato. He either did or did not have a mole on his left shoulder. None of his writings nor any of his contemporary scholars thought to mention a mole, but there really was a fact of the matter with regards to a mole on Aristotle’s shoulder. Sherlock Holmes, a fictional human, has some very real properties too. He’s a male, likes to smoke tobacco and has a friend named Watson. But there is no fact of the matter with regard to whether or not he had a mole on his shoulder. Conan Doyle never mentions a mole in his stories of the great detective. Dennett argues that like fictional characters, a narrative center of gravity (a self) has only the properties that the theory that constitutes it endows them with. He addresses the objection that fictional selves are dependent for their creation on the existence of real selves with the example of a complex but unconscious novel writing computer program that incorporates contemporary sensory data into its narrative. His tale about “Gilbert” has many parallels with an Isaac Asimov story entitled “Someday.” In Asimov’s story a future society that has become so wholly automated that it has given up the written word entirely. In this world two young boys decide to upgrade an antique automated audiobook machine called a "bard", which is capable of generating spontaneous stories based on a massive vocabulary consistent with traditional fairy stories (a device very much like Dennett’s novel writing machine) – this particular bard had been languishing unused for years - when the boys finally update it with a modern vocabulary it can tell modern stories. Though the upgrade is successful the boys soon lose interest, the bard however continues to function, telling a story to itself about itself, a lonely computer that though it was upgraded with the modern vocabulary was quickly abandoned as obsolete and left without anyone to listen to it. In essence, given the capability to process information like a human brain does a sufficiently advanced machine should have emergent properties like that of a human. Dennett and Asimov are both suggesting that a self is a functional byproduct of a brain process rather than the other way round. This is an physicalist view of the self, in that the brain produces the effect - that we then label a self, the self is not a governing device but rather incidentally as a byproduct of the governing device – the brain.
Dennett says that it is wholly “a category mistake to start looking around for the self in the brain.” Unlike centers of gravity selves have a spatio-temporal position that are far more grossly defined. My car, for example, is an extension of my self insofar as I claim it as my own and I am in control of it. That I feel the road through the tires, and the suspension and the steering-wheel I can control it as I control can control my arms and legs. Though it is classifiable as outside of my body it is an extension of my will, if I were to smash my car into yours it would be as legitimate to say I hit you as it would had I hit you with the fist on the end of my arm. For Dennett, if I read him rightly, the search for the boundaries of a self begin and end in the narrative. The more time passes the more I ‘become myself’ though we cannot undo the parts of our pasts that are determinate, our history and biological details, we can go along in response to the way the world impinges on us. We evolve, to abscond Darwinian terms, an evolutionary niche for ourselves, given our determinate baggage, in the circumstances we carry with us into the present and into the future. Dennett also allows for persons to engage in auto-hermeneutics, the self-interpretation of one's memories, to rethink and rewrite them. A process that does change the "fictional" narrative character that you have.
Dennett talks of Multiple Personality Disorder, as being one way of coping with a bifurcated narrative inconsistency. He writes, “we are all, at times, confabulators, telling and retelling ourselves the story of our own lives, with scant attention to the question of truth.” Rewriting the stories of our lives to fit the present circumstances. But I have another example. Take a situation in which one must either suffer more torture by sleep deprivation or join a cult. Though uncommon, we know that brainwashing is a real phenomenon. The classic example is Patty Hearst, heiress to the Hearst newspaper fortune and victim of terrorist kidnapping. After weeks locked in a closet she joined the cult that abducted her. She took on a new name and participated in armed robberies as a member of the terrorist organization. This phenomenon, known as Stockholm Syndrome, comes into play when a person who cannot escape, isolated and threatened with death, but shown token acts of kindness by the captor, come to empathize with the captor. A strategy of trying to keep your captor happy in order to stay alive becomes an identification with the likes and dislikes of the captor. This phenomenon also extends narratively to the behavior of battered spouses, members of religious cults (some with suicide pacts), and even holocaust victims. The way Stockholm Syndrome works, survival without maintaining a narrative consistent with one’s past isn’t a problem, the need for food, social interaction and sleep in addition to the inability to maintain even justifiable anger for days on end ball conspire for narrative shift. For a social creature like a human the quickest way to destroy a consistent narrative will is to force social isolation and a sterile sensory environment. Stockholm Syndrome can be seen as a coping mechanism utilized subconsciously by it victims to survive. Such a narrative break is very traumatizing, victims of it often don’t wish to be changed back (de-programmed), they are even known to go to great lengths to deny, minimize or even justify what was done to them!
Dennett also offers us the example of split brain processing, and based on the experimental data he presents I think he could legitimately extend his analogy of a physical center of gravity (the tipping point) to the brain in this case too. Consider for a moment a hypothetical tangerine. This particular fictional tangerine is roughly spherical. As such its has a center of gravity equally distant from its outer skin, in its center. If we then cut it in half, down the middle, we have multiplied the center of gravity of the tangerine by two, and have created a physical center of gravity in each half of the fruit– two objects, two centers. But because each is no longer spherical each tangerine has lost some of the properties it had when united (incapable of being rolled easily across a table for example). Just as a tangerine cut in half can be said to have gone from having one center of gravity, a person who has their corpus collosum severed can be said to have, under certain laboratory conditions, two selves. Thus disunited they may have lost some of the abilities they had when operating unified – just as the cut tangerine has. We don’t want to extend the analogy too much farther; we can after all create many more tangerine slices and tangerine centers of gravity with a knife than we can complex human selves with a single brain and a scalpel. But this also brings to the fore the point Damasio gets at with his notion of a proto-self being in even a primitive single celled life form like an amoeba. Knowing what are and what are not a creature’s outer boundaries is the minimum necessary byproduct of evolution. Without that capacity even the most rudimentary organism wouldn’t be able to distinguish potential nutrients from a part of itself. More complex multi-cellular animals like Zebras may lack self-consciousness, but they show even more radically complex behaviors – ones so diverse that we can attribute moods and emotions. We might say, “That zebra there. It is acting skittish today – after that scare with the lion yesterday its no wonder.” But that Zebra however it feels cannot tell itself that same story. Humans seem to offer the most radically emergent properties. We extend our self boundaries to our history, our clothing, tools, language and a view of ourselves. Whatsmore one emergent trait that no other animals other than humans do is perform actions foreseeably guaranteed to result in their immediate death. Intentional suicide is an emergent property of complex minds. Persons who commit suicide tend to do so with an eye to a narrative end – ‘goodbye, cruel world’ or some such missive – a narrative end often written down in a suicide note. Due in no small part to the stories we tell to ourselves about ourselves.
Dennett tells us also of an apocryphal story about the origins of human language and its relationship to narrative. How when blurting out a question, with no one else to hear it, one of our primitive ancestors discovered they could answer themselves! As he puts it “one component of the mind had confronted a problem that another component could solve.” Indeed, Dennett subscribes to the view that conscious thinking is a privately talking to oneself. In essence the narrative self emerged from a social network with language, and in the process internalized. This cashes out to being we are “not the captains of our ships; there is no conscious self that is unproblematically in command of the mind's resources. Rather, we are somewhat disunified. Our component modules have to act in opportunistic but amazingly resourceful ways to produce a modicum of behavioral unity, which is then enhanced by an illusion of greater unity.” Dennett then again refers back to the split brain case; we can see the mind working through the channels available to it to produce surprisingly unified results. In support of this I offer a different laboratory case. Those persons who suffer from Korsakov's Syndrome (a dementia observed during the last stages of severe chronic alcoholism which involves the complete loss of memory for recent events without effecting long term memory). For instance, Korsakov’s sufferers can’t learn to recognize the faces of people they never met before the dementia set in. They can seem normal for short time periods – you can introduce yourself start a conversation with a sufferer and then leave the room for a moment. When you return they will wonder who you are and what you’re doing there. But experimentation has shown that a Korsakov’s sufferer can be habituated to act as if they’ve remembered something that happened a short time ago. If you administer a test that results in sharp pain for wrong answers to a set of questions the patient doesn’t know – and keep the questions and answers consistent in repeated trials of the test - the subject will learn to avoid the wrong answers. If asked a subject so conditioned will claim to have chosen the right answers based on knowledge, but they cannot cite the sources for when they learned it. This is because they’ve learned unconsciously how to answer the questions to avoid pain – if the questions are math based they can infer that they are ‘just good at math’. It isn’t a lie, because it makes sense to them – they are confabulating a reason for their choices. Interestingly their unique disability would make Korsakov’s sufferers the ideal persons to be used in advertizing focus groups – refinements to an advertizing campaign could be done almost in real time.
For Dennett, the self is an abstraction, a theoretical apparatus to predict, understand, and explain the behavior of individual humans. Selves are far more complex than a physical center of gravity, indeed selves are the emergent property of complex minds, the confabulatory narrators for our actions.
